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From Neoliberalism to Variegated Neoliberalization 
The debate on neoliberalism in China started from the discussion between Harvey and 
Ong. Harvey, reading neoliberalism as a global class-offensive project promoted by 
the United States, argued that China is a “strange case” in which a “particular kind of 
neoliberalism interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control” aimed to restore 
class power through accumulation by dispossession (2005: 79). Specifically, global 
capital was exploiting China’s huge labour and consumer markets as a new spatial fix 
for continuous capital accumulation. Ong criticized this structuralist perspective. 
Adopting a governmentality perspective, she saw neoliberalism as based on mobile 
technologies for governing “free subjects” that do not conform to a particular political 
project or bundle of policies. These technologies support complex and strategic 
governmental interventions that construct new spatial and population categories as 
parts of neoliberal rationalities (2006, 2007). 
From neoliberalism to variegated neoliberalization 
This debate can be contrasted with that of variegated neoliberalization (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010). This focuses on hybridized, 
contradictory and polymorphic processes that are path-dependent, unevenly-layered 
and geographically conditioned; but also emanate from some global structural 
changes. This conception has been criticized as serving mainly to provide a useful 
language to identify and describe processes/dimensions in diverse sites and contexts 
(d’Albergo 2016: 310). Thus, the approach aims to show how particular concrete cases 
illustrate, complexify, converge and/or deviate from neoliberalism. Three examples are 
Peck (2002) on labour markets and Wu (2010) and Lim (2013) on China. While this 
does not amount to the reductionism of theoretical  “subsumption” (Jessop 1982: 71-
6 and 212-3), where any specific case is claimed to exemplify general features of 
neoliberalism, it does privilege neoliberalization as an analytical object and has led 
other critics to define the approach as akin to a descriptive “natural history” that 
discovers one or another form of neoliberalism or neoliberalization everywhere (hence 
nowhere) (Clark 2008: 136-8; Le Galès 2016: 168; Jessop in this issue). 
My article addresses these issues by exploring the stepwise movement from abstract-
simple concepts to complex-concrete analysis of socioeconomic changes.  Here I 
draw on the logical-historical approach of cultural political economy (CPE), which 
explores how the material and semiotic are articulated not only in general theoretical 
terms but also in more or less specific contexts (Sum and Jessop 2013: 196-224). It 
invites concern with three meso-level questions in dealing with the historical 
variegations in neoliberalism. First, is neoliberalization always the best entry-point for 
phenomena and processes that, at first sight, could be subsumed under this notion; 
second, how do discourses, the (il)liberal arts of governing, and their metagovernance, 
mediate neoliberalization and other processes; and, third, to what extent and how do 
hybrid forms that emerge from these contingent interactions across different sites and 
scales lead to new forms of contestation against exploitation and domination? 
Mediated variegations and hybridizations 
From a CPE viewpoint, with its interest in socioeconomic imaginaries, the first question 
broadens the examination of so-called neoliberal imaginaries and their roots in, and 
ties to, specific historical conjunctures and circumstances. Foucault’s The Birth of 
Biopolitics (2010) highlighted two differentiated veridictions of the market truth posited 
by neoliberalism: a Chicago-School neoliberal version and a Freiburg ordoliberal one. 
Chicagoans viewed markets as natural and capable of being extended to all human 
actions, subjecting them to the permanent audit of its marketized principles (Gane 
2012). Foucault drew on Eucken, Röpke and Rustow to characterize German 
Ordoliberalism. Following Röpke, he identified four major differences from the Chicago 
School: (1) the renunciation of the naturalness of the market and laissez-faire; (2) an 
emphasis on competition rather than market exchange; (3) competition as a 
governmental art to be actively pursued by the state; and (4) the state seeks legitimacy 
by creating a market-competition order that frames the economy, social, legal and 
moral arenas (Röpke, 1948: 28). In contrast to Chicagoan hostility to the state, then, 
ordoliberalism promotes a social market economy in which the state has an important 
and legitimate role in creating and governing, through contractual, juridico-political, 
and moral means the market and ensuring market competition (cf. Oksala 2017:198) 
(see also later). 
Regarding the second question, CPE explores how discourses mediate variegation 
and hybridization. Economic discourses such as economic growth, competitiveness, 
entrepreneurship, consumption, etc., circulate in policy-consultant circuits across 
different sites and scales (Sum 2009; Peck and Theodore 2013). In contrast to Ong’s 
conception, CPE sees these mobile discourses and related practices as selectively 
(re-)contextualized by structurally-embedded actors who seek to remake their 
institutional-regulatory and everyday life settings (for more on selectivity, see Sum and 
Jessop 2013: 214-29). Some of these practices can be related to meta-governance or 
“governance of governance” (Jessop 2011) as they seek to establish coordinating 
ground rules that steer, guide and collibrate other means of governing. 
Third, hybridization refers to the selective rearticulation and recontextualization of 
discourses that transform meanings and practices. These involve discursive 
technologies of new ground rules, categories and apparatuses that construct new 
meanings and marginalize others in guiding actions and processes. This is a crucial 
aspect in analysing the conjuncturally specific, multi-spatial variegation processes of 
neoliberalization (Sum and Jessop 2013: 220-23) 
Making Ordoliberal and Authoritarian Turns in Variegation Research 
To illustrate these points, I look beyond the loci classic of Reaganism and Thatcherism 
to consider how research on variegation and hybridization can be enhanced by taking 
account of ordoliberalism and non-western authoritarian settings. 
Ordoliberal turn: fear of the masses and socio-political engineering 
Foucault’s discussion of German ordoliberalism highlights the art of government in 
establishing a competition-entrepreneurial order to secure a social market economy. 
Writing in post-war Germany in the aftermath of military defeat, economic devastation, 
and loss of sovereignty, Röpke (1948: 243, 246) worried that uprooted masses were 
losing the “safety of sufficient organic social embeddedness” coming from family, 
church or local community and this might lead again to over-integration as occurred 
under Nazism (Biebricher 2011: 178-181). Thus, the ordoliberal imaginary aimed to 
rebuild the state and ground its legitimacy in a new economic, social and moral order. 
For Foucault, the ordoliberal art of governing was to establish a “society for the market” 
and cushion the “society against the market”. The former involves ordering the 
conditions of the market via planning for competition/enterprise; and actively 
intervening in the society, via legal-contractual means. The latter focuses on what 
Rustow called Vitalpolitik, i.e., a politics of life. It compensates for the negative effects 
of the market via social-political engineering of the family and community to produce 
a set of warm cultural and moral values (e.g., religion). These biopolitical ways of 
governing (Biebricher 2014: 183-8) encourage the population to become 
entrepreneurs of the self to improve their living standards and social integration to 
overcome atomization and massification (Bonefeld 2017a). 
Authoritarian turn: interventionism, bio-sovereignty and regulatory statecraft 
For Bonefeld (2017b), ordoliberalism involves ‘authoritarian liberalism’ – something 
that can also be observed increasingly in the heartlands of classic neoliberalism. In 
the China, too, we observe some ordoliberal features such as the focus on state 
building for national strength/legitimacy, state interventionism to promote 
entrepreneurship/competitiveness, and a Vitalpolitik based on neo-Confucianism and 
nationalism. These are hybridized and enmeshed with key authoritarian socialist 
ground rules/statecraft and selectively (re-)programmed by the Chinese Communist 
Party since Deng to create new sites of truth claims. 
Combining ordoliberal and authoritarian turns also returns us to the issue of sovereign 
power. Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) examined the historical western 
transition from dynastic monarchies to liberal democratic rule in which the sovereign 
power of life/death was replaced by disciplinary surveillance and biopolitical power. 
This periodization might suggest that sovereign power is in decline or even 
disappearing. Yet sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical power can overlap and 
coexist and this is especially so in non-western contexts. I now explore this possibility. 
In his later work on Security, Territory and Population (2004: 106-7), Foucault 
proposes that sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical power can become co-
implicated, with their weight varying as conjunctures change. Hindess (1996), among 
other neo-Foucauldians, echoed this position, arguing that governmentality studies 
can be extended to study China, especially as the boundary between neoliberal and 
authoritarian governmental technologies is unclear. Likewise, Dean suggests that an 
“authoritarian governmentality” comprises an ensemble of biopolitics and sovereignty 
(1999: 154). These insights stimulated a body of research on non-western 
governmentalities in colonial, socialist and authoritarian contexts (e.g., Legg 2006; 
Collier 2011; Bargu 2014). For example, working on Turkey, Bargu (2014: 51-2) 
examines authoritarian regime through the concept of bio-sovereignty as a 
contradictory hybridization of sovereignty and biopolitics. On the one hand, sovereign 
power is permeated and transformed by the rational adoption and incorporation of 
disciplinary and governmental techniques; and, on the other, disciplinary and 
governmental techniques are transformed through their fusion with sovereign power.  
Nonetheless, this mutual interpenetration and cross-fertilization of sovereign tactics 
and disciplinary and biopolitical governance oriented to controlling and improving the 
Turkish population cannot guarantee stability and is also contested. 
Chinese governmentality has been experimenting with such hybridization in fields 
such as education, professionals, community, and sexual health (e.g., Anagnost 2004; 
Sigley 2006; Kipnis 2006; Jeffreys and Sigley 2009). Some studies focus on the 
neoliberal-biopolitical side of governing the subject at a distance; others insist that the 
state remains an active participant in China’s neoliberal governance (Hoffman 2006). 
Sigley (2006: 489) concluded that Chinese governmentality involves a “hybrid 
socialist-neoliberal form of political rationality” based on the co-presence of 
authoritarian-technocratic techniques and governing of subjects via their own 
autonomy. This suggests that socialism is not dead but survives in new forms. Inspired 
by such work, I now introduce the concept of ordoliberal authoritarian governance to 
explore China’s hybridized ordoliberal and socialist authoritarian mode of governing 
and its contestation. 
Ordoliberal Authoritarian Governance in China Since 1978 
Under Deng’s leadership, China opened its door to the world market in 1978. The party 
moved away from its centrally commanding role towards more diffuse but still 
authoritarian modes of intervention to build a modern nation. Ordo-socialist modes of 
steering were selectively hybridized with ordoliberal ones to guide public and/or private 
actors in aiming for growth and social stability. This hybrid form of ordoliberal 
authoritarian governance has been reinvented several times, notably in response to 
the Tiananmen movement in 1989 and China’s entry to the WTO in 2011. 
This has involved the re-articulation of micropolitical ordo-socialist and ordoliberal 
techniques across different sites and scales. Relevant measures include: (1) re-
making the party’s legitimacy and introducing new meta-governance ground rules 
(e.g., GDPism); (2) re-programming socialist statecraft (e.g., financial control) and 
administrative guidelines/procedures to exercise panoptic “super-vision” to monitor 
subordinate units; (3) conducting bio-sovereign ordering of population; and (4) 
producing ordoliberal art of governing via moral and desires. This hybridization is 
mediated by the party and other capillary networks (e.g., regional/local governments, 
think tanks, social communal organizations, schools, media, etc.) to govern the 
economy, bureaucracy, and society. They supervise, define, open up, and access 
domains of life (e.g., growth, migrants, population quality, consumption, 
entrepreneurship, moral, nationalism, etc.) for liberal and illiberal intervention. 
Fear of the masses and the making of performance legitimacy 
Deng consolidated power after replacing Mao and his supporters as the central party-
state pursued modernization and opened up the economy to the world market. This 
strategy rested on new economic imaginaries and associated practices. such as 
‘special economic zones’ and concessionary strategies to attract ‘foreign direct 
investment’ were pursued. Domestically, Deng’s vision in 1979 was to build a 
“xiaokang society” (moderately and comfortably well-off society) but with “some getting 
rich first”. New economic programmes included lifting price controls and 
decollectivization of agriculture. These changes led to inflation, economic disparities 
and rampant corruption. Mass dissatisfaction prompted students, workers and 
peasants to demanded changes, leading to the Tiananmen movement. 
Fearful of the angry masses, Deng, in negotiation with a divided group of party elders, 
instigated a crackdown and pressed for a post-Tiananmen survival strategy for himself 
and the party (Pei 2015). Rather than basing legitimacy on Marxist-Leninist ideology, 
he envisioned a utilitarian turn to deliver growth and stability. The party’s new rationale 
was mediated by new discourses such as “socialist market economy” that regarded 
“plan” and “market” as mere “economic tools” and “stability maintenance” as “the non-
negotiable task”. New ground rules, socialist toolkits and governmental practices were 
selectively redesigned to manage party legitimacy and rule. 
The meta-governance of socialist ground-rule: National GDPism as norm 
 
GDP was selected to showcase party’s performance and legitimacy and to guide the 
metagovernance of economy and society. Before the 12th Party Congress in 1982, the 
suggestion was to double real GDP from 710 billion yuan during the 1980s and 
quadruple it to 2800 billion by 2000. To this end, the then General Secretary, Hu 
Yaobang, proposed an “8 percent annual growth rate” as “necessary to maintain social 
stability and provide jobs for tens of millions of new laborers swarming into the 
country's crowded job market every year” (China Daily, 2009). This became a 
mainstay of official rhetoric and “maintaining 8 percent annual growth rate” (bao ba) 
underpinned party’s performance legitimacy. Qi (2010: 5) termed this GDPism, which, 
from Deng (1978-89) onwards, has denoted “the belief that rapid GDP growth should 
always be the nation’s highest priority because it is the panacea for most national 
issues and the way to consolidate the government’s legitimacy”. 
 
As an ordo-socialist ground-rule, the political arithmetic of “8 percent growth rate” 
visibilizes a desirable national policy space that can deliver the twin targets of good 
growth rate and social stability.  Foucault termed this knowledging technique the 
disciplinary power of normation (2004: 57). In the Chinese case, norms. such as those 
entailed in GDPism, establish ground rules to: (1) distinguish acceptable and 
unacceptable policy actions and thus what merits promotion and funding; (2) judge 
collective and individual performance at different sites and scales; and (3) prescribe 
desirable and undesirable policy outcomes. Central party-state leaders, sub-national 
government officials, state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives reiterated this ground 
rule to showcase their performance and jostle for resources that benefit them and 
related networks. Faced with deviation from the 8 percent norm, which occurred after 
the 2008 financial crisis, the Xi leadership developed the “new normal” discourse to 
negotiate this meta-governance ground rule to a lower target range of 6.5 percent in 
a decelerating economy. 
 
The socialist statecraft of financial and non-financial control 
 
This national GDPist ground rule has been hybridized through its combination with 
pre-existing socialist statecraft of control in non-financial (e.g., appointments, 
appraisals, dismissals, etc.) as well as financial (e.g., credits, loans, licences, permits, 
etc.) sites. Financial guidance was accentuated with the appointment of Zhu Rongji to 
the Politburo Central Committee in 1992. The party extended its control over the 
financial system by channelling savings to the state-owned sector to stimulate growth. 
This development statecraft was partly enabled by institutional innovation since 1993, 
such as establishing the People’s Bank of China and other policy banks. These 
intervene to provide a good investment climate, cheap loans, subsidies and insurance 
for SOEs (state-owned enterprises), state-linked companies, sub-national 
governments and their investment arms that could drive GDP growth and capital 
accumulation. As the economic and political arenas have become intertwined, a group 
of “princelings” (children of high-ranking party members or officials) who run 
SOEs/state-linked companies or global business brokerages have been able to 
convert family ties and political connections into wealth for the families and related 
networks (Brown 2014). 
 
Apart from financial control/influence, the party also adopts other socialist modes of 
intervention, including: (1) using the Organization Department and Ministry of 
Personnel to appoint central SOEs’ top leaders; (2) a Cadre Responsibility System 
that conducts regular appraisals against centrally-determined targets (e.g., 8 percent 
GDP growth rate); and (3) a Central Commission for Discipline Inspection that 
investigates and punishes malfeasance. The activities of these national control 
mechanisms, especially the financial ones, were reduced by 2003. Ownership of the 
national SOEs was transferred to the State Asset Supervision and Administrative 
Council (SASAC) under the State Council. Its remit is to protect and enhance state 
asset values based on the statecraft of corporatization (or “administrative 
recommodification”, see Offe 1984). In China, this involves the acceleration of SOE 
mergers, profit-oriented management techniques, the listing on stock exchanges to 
enhance capital/market share, SASAC control over the appointments of senior 
managers (not their top leaders), introducing party cells in business organizations, and 
so on. This administrative commodification is complemented by the party’s use of 
“atmosphere guidance” (Norris 2016: 52) together with tightening of non-financial 
means of control, especially during leadership contests conducted in the name of anti-
corruption. 
 
Bio-sovereign ordering of the population: categorizing and differentiating population 
via hukou and suzhi 
 
As for the population, most research has focused on the biopolitical side and omit 
sovereignty issues. Bargu’s concept of bio-sovereignty (2014) offers further insights 
into biopolitics in authoritarian contexts. In China, the technology of hukou (household 
registration system) as a spatial practice dates back to the feudal era when sovereign 
control over residence facilitated levies and conscription (Wan 2015: 459). This mode 
of sovereign control was reinvented in the Maoist era to distribute scarce resources: 
the population was categorized and differentiated according to birth-place rather than 
current residency. Population with urban hukou are entitled to state welfare benefits 
such as housing, education healthcare and retirement benefits. With agricultural 
decollectivization and the opening to the world market, more young migrant workers 
moved from rural to urban areas, into township enterprises in the 1980s and industrial 
enterprises in special zones in the 1990s. However, the urban hukou system excludes 
them from access to social resources, especially when the system is implemented in 
large cities. 
 
The hukou way of national-spatial ordering of the population shows that being a rural 
peasant in China is a biopolitical and social status tied to one’s birth rather than an 
occupation (Zhang 2014). On moving to urban areas, they are classified as 
“nongmingong” (peasant workers) without hukou and welfare benefits. This illiberal 
governing technique has been relaxed with the development of non-state enterprises 
and the demand for low-cost labour since the 1980s. Several local-authority reforms, 
such as the blue-stamped hukou, allow some more educated and prosperous migrants 
to gain urban hukou. However, this de facto commodification of residence is still 
beyond the reach of most migrants, especially in large cities. “Nonmingong” remains 
a strategic state discourse to confer privileges on the urban elite and assign lower 
economic value to their migrant bodies as China became a global factory after its WTO 
entry in 2001. 
 Following this momentous move, there was a drive for further reform. The then 
President Jiang Zeman (1989-2004) promoted the strategy of “Three Represents” in 
2002. This called for the party to (1) develop advanced productive forces (e.g., 
technologies); (2) promote advanced culture (e.g., high ideals, good education and 
moral integrity); and (3) encourage capitalists to join the party as part of a strategy of 
co-option. The second goal explicitly linked the quality of the nation with the quality of 
the individuals. Thus education was an investment in the human body and the national 
suzhi (human quality) of the population for building productive forces and optimize, if 
not maximize, value. . Population qualities and their market values are judged by their 
skills, productivity, entrepreneurship, and mannerism (Anagnost 2004). This 
biopolitical turn in party rationality involved a technology of the self that makes people 
self-responsible for raising qualities and optimize themselves as human investment 
capital through lifelong learning, problem-solving and well-roundedness. The urban 
middle-classes, especially their children, invest in themselves to raise and valorize 
suzhi via consumption, lifestyle, education and special coaching classes. Their high 
suzhi potential is often contrasted with the “uncultured” rural migrant workers with low 
quality (Wallis 2013: 345), who are in need of management, discipline and training. 
This biopolitical technology of judgement generates an urban-rural social hierarchy is 
differentiated by their education, hygienic conditions, lifestyle, material consumption, 
social etiquette, and so on. 
 
Educational training programmes, which are organized by various state units, NGOs 
and commercial donors, encourage migrant workers to be more entrepreneurial and 
self-developmental in learning new vocational/technological skills and relevant social 
etiquette. Nonetheless, the suzhi-enhancing process occurs in an authoritarian setting 
where biopolitical governing via “freedom” and “choice” is intertwined/enmeshed with 
the illiberal hukou arrangements. Bargu’s concept of bio-sovereignty can capture 
some of the complexities of this paradoxical and contradictory juxtaposition of the 
hukou-suzhi practices. It is neatly illustrated in Wallis’s work (2013: 352-3), which 
shows how some women migrant workers, after attaining suzhi-raising computer-
training programmes, were re-subsumed as labouring subjects performing repetitive 
taylorized processes in digital workshops as China moved from a global factory to a 
high-tech economy. Thus the competitive logic of global capitalism cancelled the 
biosovereign push for migrant women to undertake life-enhancing and self-actualizing 
training and realize their aspiration to join the middle-classes (with urban hukou). Such 
disappointments are also reflected in the development of the Diaosi subaltern identity 
(see below). 
 
Governing the society via desires and moral: entrepreneurship, consumption and neo-
Confucianism 
 
The gaps and cracks continuously created in this paradoxical biosovereign politics are 
continuously pasted over by creating and intensifying ordoliberal techniques of 
governance through aspirations, desires and moral. For Foucault, ordoliberal policies 
target two pillars (2010: 241-2). One is to shape “society for the market” in line with 
the logics of competition and entrepreneurship; the other is to cushion “society against 
the market” by anchoring individuals in a set of warm cultural and moral values, 
including nationalism. For example, regarding the first ordoliberal pillar, President 
Jiang Zemin’s 2002 strategy of “Three Represents” aimed to co-opt entrepreneurs, 
cadre capitalists and educated professionals into the party and help to build the nation. 
This national official recognition (and even celebration) of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurship encouraged the population to regard education as a way to improve 
their suzhi and possibly boost their market value. For example, families should plan 
for their children’s education; the unemployed should become micro-entrepreneurs, 
and students should take responsibility for improving their training/qualifications, 
including periods of study abroad. New organizations, such as the New Oriental 
School, provide extra coaching to help students gain high TOEFL scores; and new 
identities such as “haiqui” (overseas returnees) provide special status and resources 
for returning scholars. These desires and related efforts and arts of career 
advancement contribute to the first pillar of building market society (cf. Jacka 2009: 
528). These aspirations were encapsulated in Premier Li Keqiang’s speech at the 
World Economic Forum in 2015: 
 
Our people are hard-working and talented. If we could activate every cell in 
society, the economy of China as a whole will brim with more vigour and gather 
stronger power for growth. Mass entrepreneurship and innovation, in our eyes, is 
a “gold mind” that provides constant source of creativity and wealth 
 
These entrepreneurial desires to innovate and excel at the national and individual 
levels dovetail with the imagined consumption capacities and lifestyle of the 
entrepreneurial middle classes. Corresponding to the official rhetoric of suzhi, glossy 
fashion/lifestyle magazines, TV programmes and other media portrayed middle-
classness in terms of taste, choice, chic lifestyle, cultural activities and foreign travel 
(Tomba 2009). Governing desires by dangling consumption carrots before a self-
disciplined population marked the arrival of consumer citizenship in China. One’s 
moral worth as a citizen involves asserting one’s rights and choices in the market 
(Hooper 2005) to enhance their everyday suzhi capital. In turn, expanding 
consumption supported the party-state’s claim to performance legitimacy. Maintaining 
this consumption-based social contract depends on the continuing ability to save 
and/or access credit/wealth aided by the party-state. This makes it vulnerable to 
excess household debt, credit and property bubbles. 
 
These ordoliberal policies to build “society for the market” have further splintering 
effects, especially when hybridized with hukou as an exclusionary mechanism and the 
exercise of state financial control to favour large SOEs, state-link companies, 
princelings and related networks, and other powerful interests. This has prompted 
mass social unrest in the form of demands for better working/pension conditions, fair 
land-based compensations, anti-corruption, anti-pollution, food safety, etc. In 
response, the party-state introduced what Foucault termed the second ordoliberal 
pillar: the cushioning of “society against the market” through a set of warm 
cultural/moral values. The idea of social harmony has been debated since 2002 and, 
by 2006, Hu Jintao, the then general secretary, announced the building of a “socialist 
harmonious society” in the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee 
meeting. Unlike classical Confucianism, which emphasizes humanity’s innate 
goodness, neo-Confucianism highlights how the cultural and moral values of the 
national population can be guided and reshaped when faced with rapid social 
challenges and personal failings. In an explanation issued on 4 March 2006, Hu even 
listed “Eight Honours, Eight Disgraces” that marked the moral boundary between good 
and evil (see List 1).  
 
List 1  Harmonious Society and Related Moral Values: “Eight Honours and 
Eight Disgraces” 
 
(1) Love the country; do it no harm. 
(2) Serve the people; do no disservice. 
(3) Follow science; discard ignorance. 
(4) Be diligent; not indolent. 
(5) Be united, help each other; make no gains at others' expense. 
(6) Be honest and trustworthy; do not give up morals for profits. 
(7) Be disciplined and law abiding; not chaotic and lawless. 
(8) Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures. 
 
Source: See CPC Promotes "Core Value System" to lay Moral Foundation for Social 
Harmony, XINHUA, Oct. 18, 2006, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006‐10/18/content_5220576.htm (accessed: 24 
April 2018). 
These moral values and accompanying normative regulation are emphasized in 
capacity training of officials, school curriculum, social work, and so on. For example, 
social work programmes are designed to build social harmony and stability at the 
communal level of families and neighbours. Communal social work, as a technology 
of care, employs many techniques to build positive interpersonal relationship and 
promote a psychology of community care (Yang 2015). It regulates life by getting local 
people to work and reflect on themselves to build consensus and positive moral values 
such as filial piety. This strategy has been reinforced under President Xi. His hope-
based vision of the “China Dream”, nationalism and “new type of great power relations” 
encourages the release of positive energy and effort to (self-)regulate the population 
to build a more caring and stable society that surpasses its western counterparts. 
 
The unevenness of ordoliberal authoritarian governance 
 
This ordoliberal nurturing of moral life and entrepreneurial potentiality co-exist with bio-
sovereign exclusionary politics (e.g., hukou and suzhi), the uneven effects of socialist 
statecraft, and the disciplinary-exploitative nature of global capitalism. This hybridized 
ensemble of discursive-material elements under ordoliberal authoritarian governance 
has contradictory effects. On the one hand, it regularizes and sediments social 
relations by, for example, co-opting (cadre) capitalists into the party and creating the 
entrepreneurial middle classes as consumer citizens with suzhi and moral values. On 
the other hand, its benefits are very uneven and provoke rising resistance from 
subaltern groups. This is evident in socioeconomic changes in urban settings following 
the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
The socialist statecraft of financial control aims to provide cheap credit, especially for 
urban projects that contribute towards China’s GDPist project. Following the 2008 
financial crisis, China’s falling growth rate and rising unemployment stimulated the 
then Hu-Wen leadership to re-ignite growth with a four trillion Renminbi (RMB) 
stimulus package (equivalent to 560 billion USD). To facilitate this package, central 
government encouraged the state-owned banks to lend to national and sub-national 
governments. To qualify for these loans, (sub-)national governments had to provide 
matching funding and did so by intensifying land acquisition and leasing land use rights 
(Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007; Lin 2014). Further funding came from setting up local 
government financial vehicles to collateralize land-use rights and raise money from 
state-owned banks and the shadow banking system. Sub-national authorities also 
allied with private developers and auxiliary building industries. These measures fuelled 
debt-based megaprojects and other real estate ventures, increased extra-budgetary 
government income, and boosted individual careers (Sum 2017). Along with a 
commercial housing boom, this inflated property bubbles in major cities and led to 
rising residential rents (Qing and Wang 2014). 
 
New Subalternity in Ordoliberal Authoritarian Governance: Making of Diaosi 
Identity 
 
Migrant workers without urban hukou endure the disciplinary-exploitative capitalist 
conditions in China’s global factory and digital workshop. Long working hours, low pay 
and lack of welfare benefits are common in factories such as Foxconn (Bieler and Lee, 
2017). This has provoked increasing labour resistance from state trade union of All-
China Federation of Trade Unions or informal labour NGOs. This collective class-
based labour consciousness intersects with the rise of other grassroot-subaltern 
identities, especially among second- or third-generation migrant workers. Their 
agency and subjectivity occupy contradictory locations of subsisting in marginal and 
subaltern conditions but also aspire to gain urban hukou and embrace suzhi lifestyle. 
 
Industrial and service migrants must also endure rising house prices or rent. They 
often rely on employer-provided dormitories (Pun 2005), rent sub-standard 
accommodation at the peripheries of towns or reside in liminal spaces (e.g., balconies, 
roof tops or underground accommodation) in central urban conurbations of global 
cities. In Beijing, some migrants rented/shared small rooms at around US$ 65 per 
month in 2014 in underground air raid shelters/storage spaces with communal 
toilets/kitchens and no natural light. About a million low-wage service workers (e.g., 
waiters, hairdressers, janitors, shop assistants, street peddlers, chefs, security guards, 
construction workers, etc.) occupy this subterranean housing in 2014 (Pulitzer Centre 
2015). These subaltern groups are dubbed a “rat tribe” and Sim (2015) has portrayed 
their lives photographically. I now explore the making of Diaosi identity as a mode of 
resistance that expresses the contradictory location of urban migrant workers. 
 
The self-representation of Diaosi subjectivity 
 
Since late 2011, many young migrant workers, who are users and makers of Internet 
pop culture and social media, feel left behind. They increasingly self-narrate their 
marginality and subalternity affectively by self-identifying as “Diaosi”. The “Diaosi” 
subject position – literally, fans of a celebrity footballer here – emerged in on-line 
battles between rival fans. They then transposed the meaning from celebrity worship 
to “fans of penis”, which is a close homonym (Sum 2017). This transposition soon went 
viral on social media. Within two months after its coining in 2011, it generated 41.1 
million search results and 2.2 million blog posts on Google and China’s Twitter-like 
Weibo respectively (Lui, 2015). Young subalterns started to proclaim themselves as 
“Diaosi” and all kinds of chat rooms and social media were set up in response (e.g., 
YY and QQ chats). 
New biopolitical meanings were added as the discourse and identity circulated in the 
social media. The new identity soon expressed marginality, exclusion, devaluation, 
frustration, hardship, and social pain as well as unfulfilled consumer and romantic 
desires of migrant workers. They represent themselves as coming from 
underprivileged background earning a meagre wage, consuming little and having no 
social connections.1 Their meagre income/consumption/borrowing capacity and low 
social standing are coupled in social-emotional terms with a sense of living a devalued 
life of long working hours, poor housing, uncertain career, living away from family, guilt 
towards parents at home, and empty emotional life with little love/romance/intimacy. 
This emptiness and loneliness are often highlighted in Diaosi narrations of how they 
spent Valentine’s Day, Christmas, festive seasons and the small hours of the night 
looking for Internet companions. Such affective discourses from the margins express 
collective social experiences grounded in the exclusionary practices of hukou and 
suzhi as well as inequalities generated in the everyday economic and social life of 
global capitalism. 
 
Resistance via imagined biopolitical binary 
 
This everyday making of Diaosi subalternity is expressed further through a biopolitical 
binary that depicts two main gendered body types based on their unequal access to 
power networks, consumption, love, romance and intimacy. First, male Diaosi self-
deprecate as “poor, short and ugly” losers (Marquis and Yang 2013: 3). With meagre 
income and unattractive physiques, they construct themselves as unable to impress 
girls by showering them with material gifts and/or charm. They have ‘no house, no car 
and no bride/girlfriend’ and spend most of their time at home, use cheap mobile 
phones, surf on the Internet, and play media games such as DotA. This male-oriented 
diaosi construction has gradually spread to female subalterns (Sum 2017).  
 
Second, the Diaosi identity expresses social inequalities by juxtaposing its own body 
with an elite type, Gaofushuai, who are (1) “tall, rich and handsome”; and (2) 
“princelings” with special social connections enabling them to gain socialist (non-
)financial advantages. Diaosi regard this second group as “superior”: they enjoy the 
‘three treasures’ (iPhone, sports car and designer watch) (Marquis and Yang 2013: 9) 
and can attract beautiful girls. This binary contrast involves a mix of latent critique, 
self-mockery, self-protection, and self-entertainment (Yang, Tang and Wang, 2015). It 
is a mundane way of protesting and relieving pressure in an authoritarian system that 
combines the drive for GDP growth/consumption with an exclusionary statecraft tied 
to a biopolitical mode of governing. The resultant gaps between these two imagined 
groups are further highlighted online via satirical cartoons, everyday photographs, TV 
shows, fantasy talks, etc. These include comparing their diverse modes of transport 
(bus vs. BMW), brands of smartphones (Nokia vs. iPhone); eating places (side-street 
stores vs. expensive restaurants), and romantic encounters. 
 
Diaosi also construct themselves as “romantically unlucky” as their ideal girlfriends 
(named “goddesses”) are “Bafumei” (fair-skinned, rich and pretty) and not “Heimu’er” 
(“Black Fungus” women who are overly experienced sexually). Given their meagre 
income, unattractive physique and the existence of a match-making industry catering 
mainly for rich men (Larmer 2013), Diasoi expect to lose out in the competition for 
Bafumei girls by rich and powerful Gaofushuai/princelings. These Diaosi narrations 
reflect a mix of precarious life with little money and no background; the self-mockery 
of a fate with no future/hope; the emotional emptiness of being shunned/mocked by 
“goddesses”, the latent hostility towards social elitism embodied by Gaofushuai/ 
princelings; and the despair of not being accepted. Yet these self-deprecating views 
also implicitly endorse the dominant norms, sexual stereotypes, and unfulfilled 
ordoliberal dream in entrepreneurial and consumer society. 
 
Some subalterns reject this marginality, others accept it. Some indulge in consumption 
and/or seek pleasure from the culture industries (e.g., live-streaming on social media). 
Others live in hope and assume personal responsibility to fulfil these entrepreneurial-
consumerist dreams by improving “suzhi”, obtaining better qualifications, finding good 
jobs, meeting good marriage partners, and moving from their underground existence 
and gaining hukou. This system is by no means consistent or coherent; it contains 
“contradictory consciousness” and fragmentation as subalterns seek to come to terms 
with China’s emerging ordoliberal authoritarian governance and its officially promoted, 
but unevenly developing, consumer citizenship regime. 
 
Re-establishing control under Xi’s leadership 
 
This embodiment of marginal identity online coexists with other ideational clusters on 
the social media. They range from pro-Mao to pro-market/American as well as 
nationalist, religious and social equality groups (Shi-Kupfer et al. 2017). Together with 
more materially-based challenges such as labour and pension strikes, these groups 
are seen to threaten China’s social stability. The Xi leadership is responding by 
tightening control via: (1) intensifying censorship, firewall and key-word blocking; (2) 
promoting his personality cult; (3) placing party cells in private and foreign businesses; 
and (4) creating an online “social credit” system. This latter system is a 2014 
government initiative to create a big-database on the financial creditworthiness and 
social behaviour of citizens, companies and NGOs. When fully implemented in 2020, 
this way of quantifying “virtue” and awarding people with high “social credit” scores is 
a further development for the digital age of socialist statecraft of keeping personal 
records from cradle to grave. As a bio-sovereign-disciplinary technique, it (1) 
encourages citizens to self-responsibilize to become trusted citizens in building 
national morality; and (2) enhances the party’s discipline-surveillance-security 
mechanisms in monitoring and controlling the masses with the use of big data 
technologies. This kind of digital bio-sovereign and disciplinary technique aims to 
provide a techno-moral fix that helps to sustain party rule but also adds to the 
underlying unevenness and struggles of everyday life for the subaltern groups to 




This article employs CPE to pose three meso-level questions that can facilitate 
movement from general concepts and propositions about the hybridized, variegated 
nature of neoliberalization to specific empirical cases. First, is neoliberalization always 
the best entry-point for phenomena and processes that, at first sight, could be 
subsumed under this notion; second, how do discourses, the (il)liberal arts of 
governing, and their metagovernance, mediate neoliberalization processes; and, third, 
to what extent and how do hybrid forms that emerge from these contingent interactions 
across different sites and scales lead to new forms of contestation against exploitation 
and domination? In answering these questions, inspired by Foucault, I adopt an 
ordoliberal entry-point and combine it with a greater emphasis on the authoritarian 
nature of neoliebralizations. Together, I suggest that these turns provide a productive 
perspective on variegation research, especially in non-western settings. 
I introduced the concept of ordoliberal authoritarian governance and illustrated from 
the case of (post-)Deng China. To maintain the party-state’s performance legitimacy, 
new meta-governance ground rules have been developed that hybridize socialist 
statecraft, bio-sovereign and ordoliberal techniques to govern desires and morals. This 
ensemble of discursive-material elements become regularized and sedimented in an 
authoritarian mode of ordoliberal-socialist rule. But this generates unevenness and 
contradictions as China deepens its national authoritarian rule and its ties with global 
capitalism. One contradictory response in these changing social relations is the 
emergence of a subaltern Diaosi identity that uses corporeal categories, humour and 
social pain to subvert and submit to China’s ordoliberal authoritarian mode of rule in 




1 The Market and Media Research Centre, Beijing University, conducted a survey on 
the 2014 Living Conditions of Diaosi. Of 210,000 youths interviewed, over 60% 
described themselves as Diaosi. They earned RMB 2917.7 (USD 479). From this, they 
spent RMB 500 (USD 81) on rent, RMB 39 (USD 6) per day for 3 meals, RMB 1076 
(USD 174) to send to parents, and RMB 500 (USD 81) on vacations. 
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